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ABSTRACT 
In the traditional retail industry, some supermarket chains and department stores have been maintaining strong 
positions as the market comes to maturity. They can make use of the strong positions to squeeze their suppliers and 
obtain extra earnings. This situation may be challenged by the rapid development of e-commerce. Consumers’ 
purchase habits have been changing and many manufacturers are starting to sell goods through electronic retailers, in 
addition to their traditional distribution channels. This paper analyzes price and service competition in the dual-
channel supply chain with both pure play Internet and strong bricks-and mortar retailers, investigates the influence of 
retailer power and proposes some competitive strategies for traditional retailer under e-commerce environment. The 
demand model is proposed based on consumer utility theory, and Stackelberg theory is used to analyze the game 
process in which the manufacturer is the leader and the two retailers, acting simultaneously, are the followers. The 
equilibrium price and service decisions of the supply chain members are reached. The analysis of the competitive 
strategy is divided into two parts. Firstly, the influence of the retailer power on members of the supply chain is 
examined. We find that although the traditional retailer can use its power to depress the wholesale price, this strategy 
cannot help the traditional retailer increase its profit. Secondly, other competitive strategies of the traditional retailer 
are analyzed and the traditional retailer is found to be able to improve its operating status through adjusting prices and 
services via specific actions. 
 
Keywords: supply chain, online retailer, offline retailer, retailer power, service diversity. 
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1. Introduction 
With the improvement of the concentration of the 
traditional retail industry, some large retail groups 
have emerged . The channel power switches from 
manufacturers to retailers, putting retailers in a 
stronger position within the supply chain with the 
help of retailers’ channel-controlling force [1]. 
However, motivated by the application of 
information technology and the rapid development 
of electronic commerce, greater numbers of 
manufacturers are building up dual-channel supply 
chains in order to sell goods through a traditional 
retailer and an electronic retailer at the same time. 
In fact, we can easily find a product currently sold 
at Wal-Mart stores and online at Amazon. 
Manufacturers have become less dependent on 
traditional retailers because of the emergence of 
electronic retailers. The competition from the 
electronic retailers in consumer markets has 
challenged the predominant position of traditional  
 
 
retailers. The ability to respond to continuous and 
unexpected changes is essential for success in the 
market [2].Therefore, it is quite important and 
significant to explore the effect of retailer power 
and formulate a resolution for traditional retailers 
under the evolving competitive environment. 
 
The competitive environment of supply chain has 
been changing constantly and relevant researches 
have been paid general attention to [3]. There are 
a number of studies that concern the optimal 
decisions and competitive strategies in dual-
channel supply chains composed of a traditional 
retailer and a dominant manufacturer with an 
established direct electronic channel. In terms of 
price competition, which is considered the most 
direct manifestation of channel conflict, Liu and 
Zhang (2006) found that personalized pricing is a 
useful strategy for a traditional retailer to deter a 
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manufacturer from selling directly to consumers 
[4]. Cai et al. (2009) studied the impacts of 
different price discount contracts and pricing 
schemes on the dual-channel supply chain and 
found that simple price discount contracts can 
effectively improve the supplier's and retailer's 
performance [5]. Khouja et al. (2010) considered 
the existence of retail-captive consumers and 
found that the size of retail-captive consumer 
segment greatly influences the manufacturer in the 
channel selection process [6]. Huang et al. (2013) 
considered production cost disruptions in a dual-
channel supply chain and derived optimal pricing 
decisions for the supply chain [7]. 
 
Some studies have also focused on channel 
competition with non-price factors. Dumrongsiri et 
al. (2008) conducted a numerical analysis and 
found that improving service quality is an efficient 
way for a traditional retailer to increase its profits 
[8]. In addition, Yan and Pei (2009) found that the 
higher service quality of the traditional retailer will 
be beneficial to the whole supply chain and can 
help to reduce channel conflict [9]. Dan et al. 
(2012) found that the service strategy of the 
traditional retailer will greatly influence the pricing 
decisions and final profits of both the manufacturer 
and the retailer [10]. Xu et al. (2012) analyzed the 
channel configuration strategy to be adopted when 
both price and delivery lead time in the online 
channel are endogenously determined and found 
that the choice of channel structure depends on 
customer acceptance of the online channel and the 
cost parameters [11]. Tsao and Su (2012) 
considered the influence of warranties and found 
that both the manufacturer and the retailer earn 
more profit in a cooperative game than in a non-
cooperative game [12].  
 
Liu et al. (2013) compared the traditional co-op 
advertising model with the dual-channel co-op 
advertising model and discussed the optimal co-op 
advertising strategy [13]. In these studies, 
manufacturers are usually considered to be in the 
dominant position in the supply chain and to 
determine wholesale prices to influence retailers. 
The downstream retailers in the supply chain 
decide their retail prices accordingly and often stay 
relatively passive positions. To some extent, 
manufacturers are the core enterprises in supply 
chain. This is not suitable to supply chain with 
strong retailer. A strong retailer usually has 
dominance over not only the retail price but also 
the wholesale price, which implies the use of more 
diversified competitive strategies. In fact, for a 
greater share of the total profit, traditional retailers 
often utilize their strong positions in the channel to 
depress wholesale prices [14]. 
 
The variety of electronic distribution channel gives 
manufacturers different choices. To satisfy the 
needs of online shopping, a manufacturer can not 
only establish its own electronic channel, but also 
distribute its products through electronic retailers. 
Some studies have also focused on the 
competition within a dual-channel supply chain in 
which a manufacturer distributes its products 
through a traditional retailer and an electronic 
retailer. Brynjolfsson et al. (2009) found that the 
competition between traditional and electronic 
retailers can be intense when consumers purchase 
popular products that have low search costs in 
both electronic and traditional channels [15]. Liao 
and Shi (2009) found that the easily accessible 
local market and the concern about risk in the 
virtual environment are influencing factors that can 
significantly affect consumers’ attitudes and 
behavioral intention to use electronic retail [16]. 
Yan (2010) developed a profit-maximization model 
to investigate the benefits of demand forecast 
information-sharing between the competitive 
traditional and electronic retailers and found that 
the two different retailers will benefit from 
information sharing [17]. 
 
Yan and Ghose (2010) developed a game-
theoretic model to examine the value of forecast 
information about consumers’ willingness to pay 
and concluded that forecast accuracy has a 
greater effect on the performance of a traditional 
retailer than on the performance of an electronic 
retailer [18]. Tojo and Matsubayashi (2011) 
considered the presence of free-riding effect 
arising from the product information provided by 
the e-tailer and found that the optimal strategy of 
providing information depends mainly on the 
degree of free-riding and the consumers’ 
reservation price [19].The five aforementioned 
studies preset the unit costs of retailers and focus 
on price competition between the two types of 
retailers. By contrast, little attention has been paid 
to vertical competition in the supply chain and the 
influence of non-price factors. Considering the 
non-price factors and introducing a manufacturer 
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to decision-making processes can help to make 
the literature more thorough and in-depth. Xu et al. 
(2013) examined the relationship between pricing 
and the risk of price competition brought by price 
comparison service, which is independent with all 
parties of the supply chain, and studied the pricing 
strategies of retailers and supplier [20].  
 
In their research, supplier adjusts its wholesale 
price based on the signal of price comparison 
service. Liu and Liu (2013) analyzed the decision-
making processes of supply chain members and 
found that channel acceptance plays a critical role 
in influencing equilibrium prices and profits [21]. 
They considered the decision-making of 
manufacturer and the influence of services. 
 
However, the online sales market is considered to 
be perfectly competitive, and the online retailer 
cannot determine its retail price, which means that 
the influence of the electronic retailer is not fully 
included.  
 
Also, all the above studies on supply chain with 
both traditional retailer and electronic retailer are 
not involved with retailer power. Since the 
influence of retailer power has been pretty 
common in traditional retail channel at present, 
researches on this are worth further attention. 
 
Based on the analysis above, this paper aims to 
analyze competition in a dual-channel supply chain 
composed of a manufacturer, a traditional retailer 
and an electronic retailer. The traditional retailer 
retains a strong position. Equilibrium decisions will 
be reached with considering services. The 
influence of retailers’ power on channel members 
will be studied and the competitive strategies of 
traditional retailers will be explored. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as 
follows: in Section 2, related parameters and 
assumptions are introduced and the basic model is 
presented. In Section 3, we study the equilibrium 
game of supply chain members to determine their 
optimal decisions. 
 
 The influence of retailer power and different 
competitive strategies of the traditional retailer are 
analyzed in Section 4. Finally, concluding remarks 
are presented in Section 5. 
 
2. The model 
 
2.1 Consumer utility model 
 
In a dual-channel supply chain, a manufacturer 
distributes a single product through a traditional 
retailer and an electronic retailer at the same time 
(Fig.1). The traditional retailer holds a strong 
position within the supply chain, making the 
manufacturer unable to determine the wholesale 
price in the traditional channel. The manufacturer 
produces a single product at unit cost c and 
distributes through the traditional retailer at 
wholesale price wt. Let wt denote the benchmark 
wholesale price in the traditional retail channel, 
which is exogenous and determined by a long-term 
cooperation contract between the manufacturer 
and the traditional retailer, and let  denote the 
wholesale price-controlling coefficient of the 
traditional retailer, 0<Od. At the same time, the 
manufacturer distributes the same product through 
the electronic retailer at wholesale price we. The 
traditional and electronic retailers resell the product 
to consumers at price pt and pe, respectively. 
 
 
Let V be the ideal value of the product, which is 
consistent among various consumers. Consumers’ 
acceptance of the electronic channel is measured 
by T. Considering the existence of risk in an 
electronic retail channel (e.g., differences between 
the real object and the description of the product, a  
 
Figure 1. A dual-channel supply chain system. 
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complex return and exchange procedure, a delay 
in delivery, etc.), we assume 0<T<1 [22]. The 
traditional retailer has competitive advantages in 
providing value-added services (e.g., field trials, 
professional shopping advice, etc.) that the 
electronic retailer cannot provide because of the 
restrictions of the channel mode. Let s denote the 
service level of the traditional retailer and G the 
service sensitivity of consumers. We assume that 
the marginal cost of service increases with the 
improvement of service level. The cost of providing 
services is K 212 s  where K indicates the cost-
benefit ratio of consumer services. This modelling 
approach is a common practice in the related 
areas of study [9,23,24]. In the traditional retail 
channel, convenience and time are really 
influencing factors when consumers make 
purchase decisions [25]. A consumer pays the cost 
of searching and purchasing goods (e.g., traffic 
cost, time cost, etc.), and we use t as the cost 
coefficient of buying from the traditional retailer 
and x to measure the distance between the 
consumer and the traditional retailer, 0dxd1. Let P 
denote the cost of buying from the electronic 
retailer. 
 
The assumptions of this model are as follows: 
 
1. The consumer market is linear. Consumers are 
uniformly distributed within the consumer 
population from 0 to 1, with a density of 1. 
Consumers make decisions of whether to 
purchase a product and which channel to 
purchase from. The traditional retailer is located 
at the original point of the market and 
consumers’ cost of buying from the traditional 
retailer is positively related to the distance 
between the consumer and the retailer, which 
means that the purchase cost of a consumer 
located at x is tx; 
 
2 Supply chain members make decisions under 
circumstances of symmetric information. Retail 
prices are higher than wholesale prices, and 
wholesale prices are higher than 
manufacturing costs, i.e., c<min(Owt, we) and 
max(Owt, we)<min(pt, pe). 
 
In sum, we use G   t tU V p tx s  to denote 
the consumer utility derived from the traditional 
retailer and T P  e eU V p  to denote the 
consumer utility derived from the electronic 
retailer. Consumers purchase a product from the 
retailer that offers a higher level of utility. 
 
2.2 Demand and profit functions 
 
A consumer will choose to purchase a product 
from the traditional retailer when ! max(0, )t eU U  
or from the electronic retailer when 
! max(0, )e tU U . Which retailer to choose is of 
no difference to a consumer when  t 0e tU U . 
 
We can calculate the threshold 
T P G     1 1[(1 ) ]t ex V p p st , which indicates 
that_  t eU U ,_and._the._threshold G  2
1( )tx V p st , 
which indicates that  0tU . Taking the valid 
interval of x  (i.e., d d0 1x ) into consideration, 
we have  0tU  when  2{0,min[max(0, ),1]}x x , 
which means that a consumer whose distance 
from the traditional retailer exceeds 
2{0,min[max(0, ),1]}x  will not purchase from the 
traditional retailer because of its negative utility.  
 
Similarly, a consumer will not purchase from the 
electronic retailer when  0eU . 
 
Let tq  and eq  denote the demands of the 
traditional retailer and the electronic retailer, 
respectively. tq  and eq  vary as the relationship 
between 1x  and 2x  changes. 
 
If !1 2x x , then 
T P G G     !  1 1[(1 ) ] ( )t e tV p p s V p st t ._ 
This_ inequality- can -be -further –simplified- to 
T P   0eV p , which means that { 0eq , and 
no demand is driven by the electronic channel. 
 
If _ d1 2x x , then  T P  t 0eV p , and three 
cases can be found as follows: 
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(i) When T P G     d(1 ) 0t eV p p s , 
 
§ · § · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹© ¹
0
1
t
e
q
q
 
 
(ii) When T P G      0 (1 ) t eV p p s t , 
 
T P G
T P G
§ ·    ¨ ¸§ · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹      ¨ ¸© ¹
1[(1 ) ]
11 [(1 ) ]
t e
t
e
t e
V p p sq t
q
V p p s
t  
 
(iii) When T P G     t(1 ) t eV p p s t , 
 
§ · § · ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸© ¹© ¹
1
0
t
e
q
q
 
 
In case (i), all consumers purchase products from 
the electronic retailer. In case (iii), all consumers 
purchase products from the traditional retailer. 
Because this paper analyzes the context of a dual-
channel supply chain, the following sections will 
concentrate on case (ii), in which the two channels 
simultaneously generate demand. The demand 
functions of the traditional retailer and the 
electronic retailer are described as follows: 
 
T P G     1[(1 ) ]t t eq V p p st  
 
T P G      11 [(1 ) ]e t eq V p p st  
 
Accordingly, let S t , S e  and Sm  denote the profits 
of the traditional retailer, the electronic retailer and 
the manufacturer, respectively, which can be 
established as follows: 
 
S O K   21( )
2t t t t
p w q s
 
 
S  ( )e e e ep w q  
 
 
S O   ( ) ( )m t t e ew c q w c q              
 
3. Optimal decisions of members 
 
In this section, we develop a Stackelberg decision-
making model to illustrate the gaming process. In 
the first stage, the manufacturer sets the wholesale 
price of the electronic channel. In the second 
stage, the traditional retailer and the electronic 
retailer launch a Nash simultaneous movement 
game in which the former determines the 
traditional retail price and service level, and the 
latter determines the electronic retail price. As 
mutually independent operational entities, each 
participant in the game takes its own profit as the 
optimizing goal. 
 
3.1 Best responses of the retailers in the second stage 
 
The profit functions of the traditional retailer and 
the electronic retailer are as follows: 
 
S O K
O T P G K
  
       
2
2
1( )
2
1 1( )[(1 ) ]
2
t t t t
t t t e
p w q s
p w V p p s s
t  
(9) 
 
S
T P G
 
­ ½       ® ¾¯ ¿
( )
1( ) 1 [(1 ) ]
e e e e
e e t e
p w q
p w V p p s
t  
           (10) 
 
The traditional retailer makes decisions to realize 
S
,t
t
p s
max , and the electronic retailer makes 
decisions to realize Smax
e
e
p
. The first-order partial 
derivatives of S t  are taken with respect to tp  and 
s , and the first-order partial derivatives of S e  are 
taken with respect to ep . Let the derivatives be 
zero, i.e., 
Sw  w 0
t
tp
, 
Sw  w 0
t
s
 and 
Sw  w 0
e
ep
. We 
can obtain three reaction functions by solving the 
equation set: 
 
 
 
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
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K G O K T P K
G K
       
2 2
2
(2 ( )
3
) t e
t
t w t V V
p
w t
t  
           (11) 
  G T O P
G K
    
  2 3
e tt V V w ws
t  
 
K T O P G
G K
        
2
2
( )2 2 )
3
(e t e
e
t t V V w w t w
p
t  
           (13) 
 
3.2 Decision-making of the manufacturer in the 
first stage 
 
The profit function of the manufacturer is: 
 
S O
O T P G
T P G
   
      
­ ½       ® ¾¯ ¿
( ) ( )
1( )[(1 ) ]
1( ) 1 [(1 ) ]
m t t e e
t t e
e t e
w c q w c q
w c V p p s
t
w c V p p s
t  
                        (14) 
 
The manufacturer makes decision to realize 
Smax
e
m
w
 . Substitute Eqs. 11, 12 and 13 into Eq. 
14, let Sw  w 0
m
ew
 . We can obtain the optimal 
wholesale price charged by the manufacturer to 
the electronic retailer: 
 
G KO K K K T KP
K
    
 
2
* 2 2
2e
tw t V Vw
 
 
Substituting Eq. 15 into Eqs. 11, 12 and 13, we 
obtain the optimal retail price and service level of 
the traditional retailer and the optimal retail price of 
the electronic retailer: 
 
K G O G K O T P
G K
       
2 2 2
2
* 4 2 (6 )
2( 3 )
t t
t
t w t t w V V
t
p
 
           (16) 
 
 
 
G K K K T G KP
K G K
  
  

*
2
2
4
2 3
s
t V V
t
 
 
  G K T O PK G K
K T O P G
    
     
 2
2 4
*
2
6 2 )
2 3
2 (4 2 2 3
(
2 ]
1
)
[ t
t
e V V t wp
t k
t t V V w  
 
Substituting Eqs.16, 17 and 18 into Eqs. 6, 7 and 
8, we obtain the equilibrium profits of the traditional 
retailer, the electronic retailer and the 
manufacturer:  
 
   
 
K K K T G KP K G
G
S
K K
    
 
22 2
2
*
2
4 2
8 3
t
t V V t
t
 
 
 
 
K K T G K KP
G K
S    
 
2
2
*
2
2
2
4 3
e
t V V t
t
 
 
G KO KP K KK G K
T K K P G K K
K O P
S
T
P G
    
    

 

    
2
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 4
*
2
( )
( )
(1
1 [2 2 2 4
4 3
2(1 )(2 )
(12 12 4 4
)
])
t
t
m w c tt
tV V V V
t w ct t t  
 
4. Competition analysis 
 
In this section, the effect of depressing wholesale 
price will be examined and more competitive 
strategies for the strong retailer in dual-channel 
supply chain will be explored. 
 
4.1.Effect of depressing wholesale price by 
channel power 
 
Proposition 1 
SS
O O O
w ww! !  w w w
* **
0, 0, 0e emw  
 
Proposition 1 indicates that the traditional retailer 
can influence the equilibrium profit of the 
manufacturer and the wholesale price in the  
 
 
 
 
(12)
(15)
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
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electronic channel. It can be proven that the 
wholesale price in the electronic channel is higher 
than the wholesale price in the traditional channel. 
If the wholesale price-controlling coefficient 
decreases, the traditional retailer achieves a lower 
wholesale price, and the manufacturer must 
therefore reduce the wholesale price in the 
electronic channel and receives a lower profit. 
However, it can be seen that the equilibrium profit 
of the electronic retailer will not be influenced by 
the controlling force of the traditional retailer; the 
influence of a retailer’s power is limited to its 
original channel and cannot expand to the retailer 
in the other channel. Since the effect of strong 
position is limited for the traditional retailers, they 
can’t exert enough influence on their horizontal 
competitors in e-commerce environment. This may 
explain the percussive development of electronic 
retailing in the past few years. 
 
Proposition 2. SO O
w w  w w
* *
0, 0t tq  
 
Proposition 2 indicates that the equilibrium profit 
and the demand of the traditional retailer are not 
related to the wholesale price-controlling 
coefficient. This phenomenon indicates that 
depressing the wholesale price is not an effective 
competitive strategy for the traditional retailer. 
 
Although depressing the wholesale price 
guarantees the traditional retailer greater freedom 
in retail pricing, this freedom may be handled by 
the manufacturer, who can adjust the wholesale 
price in the electronic channel, and the change in 
wholesale price will also influence the electronic 
retailer’s retail price. These changes will finally 
influence the optimal price of the traditional retailer 
and offset the effect of the lower wholesale price. 
As e-commerce has become a long-term trend, a 
traditional retailer cannot achieve superior profit 
through a monopoly because of the invalidation of 
its original competitiveness. Despite the fact that 
depressing wholesale price is a common 
competitive strategy to a strong retailer in supply 
chain with single-retailer channel, this proposition 
shows us the invalidity of depressing wholesale 
price in a dual-channel supply chain. The strong 
retailer will have to find other effective ways to 
establish competitive advantages. 
 
4.2 Competitive strategies for the strong retailer in 
e-commerce environment 
 
Proposition 3. Sw w! !w w
* *
0, 0t tq
V V
 
 
Proposition 3 indicates that the demand and profit 
of the traditional retailer are positively related to 
the ideal value of the product. Strictly restricted by 
the specific transaction process, the electronic 
channel gives consumers more convenience and 
additional risk at the same time (e.g., the 
difference between the real object and the 
description, a complex return and exchange 
process, a delay in delivery, etc.). Consumers 
seem to be able to finish their purchase within one 
click, but the final results are not as guaranteed as 
those in the traditional channel. Such risks may 
compel consumers to prefer the traditional channel 
to the electronic channel when the value of a 
product is comparatively high. Therefore, higher-
value products in the traditional channel have 
comparatively stronger resistance to channel 
competition and conflict than lower-value products 
do. For this reason, the traditional retailer can 
retain its competitive edge and resist the impact of 
the electronic retailer by selling higher-value 
products. Since higher-value often means higher-
margin, this is also an advisable choice for the 
traditional retailers to offset the higher cost arising 
from their offline model. 
 
Proposition 4 ST T T
w w w  w w w
* * *
0, 0, 0t tp s  
 
Proposition 4 shows that the equilibrium profit, 
optimal traditional retail price and service level are 
negatively related to consumers’ acceptance of the 
electronic channel. When consumers’ acceptance 
of the electronic channel increases, which implies 
that consumers believe that the difference between 
the two channels is small, price competition 
becomes fiercer and the traditional retailer gains 
less profit. For example, in the book retail industry, 
electronic retailers can meet consumer demand at 
lower prices as efficiently as traditional retailers 
can, and therefore the traditional book retail 
industry experiences fierce competition from 
electronic retailers and must lower prices. In this  
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case, the differentiated experience and services of 
traditional retailers do not function in a cost-
effective way. On the contrary, the experience and 
services of traditional retailers may experience 
unreasonable cost pressure. The rise of Amazon and 
the simultaneous decline of traditional bookstores 
reflect this phenomenon to some degree. 
 
Proposition 5 G G
w w! !w w
* *
0, 0t tp q  
 
Proposition 5 indicates positive correlations 
between the equilibrium price, the demand of the 
traditional retailer and the service sensitivity of 
consumers. This means that if the service 
sensitivity of consumers in the traditional channel 
is relatively high, the traditional retailer should 
concentrate on the services that highly reflect the 
channel mode and invest more in such services to 
expand its market share. To the traditional retailer, 
providing on-site service is a great advantage over 
electronic retailer. Such service does play an 
important role in consumers’ purchase decisions. 
Traditional retailers can better cope with the 
competition of electronic retailers through 
strengthening their own competitive advantage. 
For example, to address competition from 
electronic retailers, traditional mobile phone stores 
can provide more value-added services such as 
professional system updates, software installation 
and convenient after-sale services. These 
differentiated services may help consumers have a 
better understanding of the traditional channel and 
accept the price variance over electronic retailers. 
 
Proposition 6 
w w w w
* *
0, 0tq s
t t
 
 
Proposition 6 shows that the equilibrium demand 
and service level of the traditional retailer are 
negatively related to the cost coefficient of buying 
from the traditional retailer. The higher the cost 
coefficient is, the lower the demand will be in the 
traditional channel. Thus, the traditional retailer 
must work to reduce the traffic cost in order to 
attract consumers. Purchasing cost is always an 
important consideration for the consumers to make 
purchase decisions. To some degree, customers 
choose electronic channel because of its 
convenience and usability. Traditional retailers 
should work to make their storefront more 
accessible to the consumers. Many similar 
situations exist in the real world. For example, in 
China, supermarket chains such as Carrefour 
attract consumers to their stores through providing 
free commuter transportation for consumers. 
Home appliance retail chains such as Suning and 
Gome continue to establish new shops to increase 
the convenience of shopping at their stores. Lower 
buying costs can encourage more consumers to 
visit traditional stores, while simultaneously, higher 
service levels can help increase consumer utility 
and stimulate customers to buy products. 
 
5. Conclusions and future research 
 
In this paper, we study a dual-channel supply 
chain composed of a manufacturer, a traditional 
retailer and an electronic retailer. The influence of 
retailers’ power and the competitive strategies of 
the traditional retailer are explored within the 
context of the traditional retailer holding a strong 
position in the supply chain. Our results indicate 
that the traditional retailer may control the 
wholesale price and influence the profit of the 
manufacturer; however, the equilibrium profit of the 
traditional retailer is not related to the wholesale 
price-controlling coefficient.  
 
Therefore, depressing the wholesale price is no 
longer an effective competitive strategy for the 
traditional retailer in a dual-channel supply chain. 
The traditional retailer can cope with the “demand 
shock” of the electronic retailer by selling higher-
value products, concentrating on the services that 
are better suited for the channel mode and 
reducing the traffic cost. The existence of channel 
differences also helps the traditional retailer remain 
competitive. With the increase in consumer 
acceptance of the electronic channel, the 
traditional retailer may have to reduce prices, but if 
the service sensitivity of consumers in the 
traditional channel remains relatively high, the 
traditional retailer can raise prices. When 
consumers believe that the difference between the 
two channels is small, providing many services 
would be uneconomical for the traditional retailer. 
However, if the buying cost is relatively low in the 
traditional channel, the competitiveness of the 
electronic retailer is comparatively weakened. In 
such a situation, the traditional retailer should 
improve its service level to strengthen the channel 
difference and spur profit growth. 
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This paper mainly focuses on the influence of 
retailer power and competitive strategies for a 
strong retailer, more attention can be paid to the 
strategies for manufacturers on how to cope with 
the strong retailers. Retailers and manufacturers 
may cooperate to weaken the competition and 
increase profits, which is a subject that warrants 
further research. Also future research may study 
the coordination of dual-channel supply chain with 
strong retailer. 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of 
*
ew  with 
respect to O , we obtain O
w  !w
*
0e t
w
w .  
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of S *m  with 
respect to O , we obtain SO
w  !w
*
0m tw . Taking the first-
order partial derivatives of S *e  with respect to O , we 
obtain SO
w  w
*
0e . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of S *t  with 
respect to O , we obtain SO
w  w
*
0t . 
 
Substituting Eqs. 16 and 18 into Eq. 4, we obtain 
K K K T G KP
G K
   
  
2
2
* 4
2( 3 )t
V
q
t V
t
. Taking the first-order 
partial derivatives of *tq  with respect to O , we obtain 
O
w  w
*
0tq . 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of *tq  with 
respect to V , we obtain 
K KT
G K
 w 
w
2
*
2( 3 )
tq
V t
. 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of S *t  with 
respect to V , we obtain 
      
 
K K K T G KP K G K KTS
G K K
w       w  
2 2
2
*
2
4 2
4 3
t
t V V t
tV
This equation 
can easily prove to be positive. BecauseO t tw p  and 
!, 0t eq q , we obtainS !* 0t , then G K  !2 2 0t , and 
G K  !2 3 0t . Because T 0 1, we obtain 
K K K T G KP    !24 0t v v . Therefore, we can 
prove w !w
*
0tq
V
 and Sw !w
*
0t
V
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of S *t  with 
respect to T , we obtain 
    
 
K K K TS
T
G KP K G
G K
    

w  
 w
2 2*
22
4 2
4 3
t
t V V t V
t
 
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of 
*
tp  with 
respect to T , we obtain KG KT
w
 

w 2
*
2( 3 )
t tV
t
p
. Taking the 
first-order partial derivatives of 
*s  with respect to T , we 
obtain T
G
G K
 w  
w *
22( 3 )
Vs
t . Because G K  !2 2 0t  
and K K K T G KP    !24 0t v v , all three equations 
can easily prove to be negative. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of *tp  and 
*
tq  with respect to G , we obtain 
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K T P
G KG
G  
w 
 

w *
22 3
t
t t vp v
t
 and  
 
 
 
K T P
G KG
G   
 
w  w 22
*
3
t
t vq v
t
,_respectively.  
 
Because T 0 1, we obtain T ! 0v v , then 
T P   ! 0t v v . Therefore, the two equations 
can easily prove to be positive. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
 
Taking the first-order partial derivatives of *tq  and *s  
with respect to t , we obtain  
  
 
K G K K T KP
G K
  
w   
w  
2
22
* 3 3 3
2 3
tq
t
v v
t
 and  
  
 
G G K K T KP
G K
  
w 
w  

2
2
*
2
3 3 3
2 3
v v
t t
s
,_respectively. 
Because T 0 1, we obtain K K T !3 3 0v v , then 
G K K T KP   !2 3 3 3 0v v . Therefore, the two 
equations can easily prove to be negative. 
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